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Introduction 
 The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is a free trade agreement which has already been signed and 
enacted into force between Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore and is currently being 
negotiated by eight additional countries, including the USA, Mexico, Peru, Australia, Malaysia, Canada, 
Vietnam and Japan.  Previous literature on Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) suggests that the outcome 
of such arrangements will be, in part, determined by whether the nations involved in the agreement meet 
certain criteria which would classify them as being ‘natural’ trading partners.  Many studies tend to focus 
on ex-post welfare evaluation, rather than an analysis of trade bloc formation;
1
this study will evaluate the 
historical trading patterns amongst the negotiating TPP nations to determine if a ‘natural’ bloc is 
emerging.  
 The main focus of the research will be on an index of trade complementarity between each trade 
partner within the TPP, as compared with the trade complementarity between the other APEC 21 and 
RCEP trade partners.  This index compares the composition of the baskets of exports from each exporting 
country with the composition of imported goods from the importing country; if the pair of countries is 
determined to be a ‘natural’ trade partner from previous trade patterns, then a free trade agreement would 
likely create additional trade between the countries, while a lower level of trade complementarity would 
imply that trade could indeed be diverted as a result of the trade agreement.  Petri, Plummer and Zhai 
have already concluded that the TPP could generate tremendous global economic benefits and provide a 
framework which would lead to even greater international economic cooperation that could exceed the 
expected benefits from the failed Doha Round of free trade negotiations.
2
 
 In the broader context of economic theory, the question at hand is whether an inter-regional trade 
agreement can be considered a ‘natural’ partnership, or if ‘natural’ trade agreements can only exist within 
geographical areas.  The Heckscher – Ohlin trade model suggests that countries should specialize in the 
production of goods and services in which they have an abundance of the resources used intensively for 
those goods and then engage in trade with countries that have a different comparative advantage.  Modern 
advancements in the exchange of information across the globe through the internet, combined with an 
increasingly international supply chain have reduced the transaction costs which have previously inhibited 
inter-regional trade.  This paper hypothesizes that the proposed TPP agreement does represent a ‘natural’ 
trade bloc that spans across the Eastern, Western, Northern and Southern hemispheres, and is supported 
by the Heckscher – Ohlin model of comparative advantage in international trade theory. 
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Review of Literature 
What is a ‘natural’ trade bloc? 
 Krugman (1991) discusses that while trade bloc formation was seen as a movement toward global 
free trade prior to the 1980’s, there has emerged a debate amongst economists in more recent times as to 
whether this is such; economic theory explains that global free trade is welfare-enhancing, so a move in 
that direction would indeed be viewed as a positive one.  Some economists describe RTA’s as a 
movement away global multilateralism, and additionally having negative welfare effects; the three main 
arguments against RTA’s are that they often divert, rather than create trade, can result in beggar-thy-
neighbor effects and trade warfare.  
 Viner (1950) discusses trade diversion as the reduction in global efficiency due to distortions in 
international markets created by eliminations of specific tariffs that cause countries to move away from 
the production of goods and services in which they have a comparative advantage.  Trade warfare can 
occur if one or more trade blocs develop and while they may allow for free trade within the bloc, they 
both find it to be beneficial to raise tariffs against the other bloc, which will reinforce welfare losses 
already created by trade diversion (Krugman, 1991). 
Krugman describes a ‘natural’ trade bloc as one in which the involved countries would already be 
trading partners absent a trade agreement; he explains that these can be created by geographical closeness, 
as this reduces transportation costs; indeed, therefore geography is the primary determinant of whether a 
trade bloc is ‘natural’ or not.  The importance behind such a bloc, is that the arguments made against 
RTA’s in the previous two paragraphs are inconsequential if the bloc is natural; if countries are already 
avid trading partners, then a FTA amongst them will be welfare-enhancing.  A basic gravity equation is 
used to evaluate the strength of a natural bloc:   (   )       (     )  ∑  
       where     
represents the value of trade between countries i and j;    and    are those countries national incomes and 
     is a dummy variable to show that the group of countries belongs to a trading group, z.3  A trade bloc 
can be considered ‘natural’ if the appropriate Υ is significant and strongly positive for that z; the results of  
the regression show that for both the US/Canada and the European trade blocs, the coefficient for Υ is 
significant at the 99% confidence level (Krugman, 1991). 
Frankel (1998) confronts the issue of natural trade blocs and proposes the additional term, 
“supernatural” trade blocs.  This would describe a reduction in welfare from trade which goes above and 
beyond what would be expected in a natural trade relationship as the result of geographic preferences.  
This study uses a gravity model of bilateral trade, measuring total trade between two countries as 
proportionate to the product of their GNP and negatively related to the distance between those countries.  
The regression also uses the product of the respective countries’ GNP per capita and dummy variables for 
being adjacent to each other, language and being members of a regional trading bloc.  The findings show 
that membership in a trade bloc has a definite, positive effect on trade, although for East Asia, the 
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inclination to trade amongst themselves is higher than what would be described as ‘natural’ and is 
therefore “supernatural” (Frankel, et al, 1998). 
Chow (2012) describes a ‘natural’ trade bloc as one in which the involved countries trade more 
intensely with each other than with different countries and, according to economic theory, must be 
complimentary with each other.  Chow presents three different indices, although the first is essentially the 
product of the second two:  The trade-intensity index is a measure of the share of country i’s exports 
going to country j relative to the share of j’s imports from the world:     
      
    
 where     = country i’s 
exports to country j ;    = total export in country i;   = total imports in country j; T = total world trade.  
The trade intensity index can be further decomposed into the trade complimentary index and the bias 
index. 
The trade complimentary index:     ∑ (






   
  
)  where k = individual commodities; 
    = country i’s export of k commodity;    = country j’s imports of k commodities;   = total trade of k 
commodity in the world.  The trade bias index is as follows:       
   
           
  .  A bias index could be 
used as a proxy for the types of factors which ordinarily impede trade, math can show            . 
4
          
Asian Trade Blocs 
 Ekanayake, et al (2010) uses an augmented gravity model to analyze the trade effects of the major 
RTA’s in Asia, including ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations); BA (Bangkok Agreement); 
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization); and SAARC (South Asia Association for Regional 
Cooperation).  With the exception of ASEAN countries, intra-bloc trade has been relatively low, although 
increasing from 1970-2008, while such trade within the ASEAN bloc had fluctuated around 20% from 
1970-1992 and then increased to about 25% from 1992 through 2008.  Trade statistics show that intra-
regional trade amongst EU countries, NAFTA and Asia-Pacific have been high, which has often been 
explained as a matter of geographical proximity, which would support the Krugman concept of a ‘natural’ 
trade bloc being largely determined by transportation costs (Ekanayake, et al, 2010). 
 Bowles and MacLean take a political economy approach to analyzing the formation of the 
ASEAN trade bloc, which was signed in 1993 by six countries after initially a purely political agreement 
had been enacted in 1967.  Some tariffs had been reduced by 1977, but only on about 5% of the traded 
goods at the time, which allows for the possibility that a changing political economy during the 1980’s 
and early 1990’s was instrumental in the formation of the bloc.  Schott defines a trading bloc as “an 
association of countries that reduces barriers to trade of goods (and also capital and services)” which 
implicitly defines states as rational actors.  Schott then adds that blocs which are usually successful over 
time have four basic characteristics: 1) similar levels of GDP; 2) geographical proximity; 3) similar trade 
regimes; 4) political commitment to regional organization
5
.  Bowles and MacLean argue that the 
formation of the ASEAN trade bloc occurred for three reasons: 1) a response to the changes in the 
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international political economy, including the Plaza Accord; 2) a shift towards business interests within 
the ASEAN countries; 3)concern of ASEAN leaders to maintain a cultural identity. 
6
 
Otsubo and Umemura (2003) discuss how from the mid 1970’s through 1995, intra-regional trade 
in East and Southeast Asia had increased from less than 20% to more than 40%.  They use a different, yet 
similar trade complementarity index from Chow, which will be the focus of the empirical analysis to 
follow in the next section of this article:       (∑ |
   
  
 
   
  
| )    where 0 < Cij < 1.  A value of 1 
would mean that the exports from country i would perfectly match the imports from country j; a value of 
0 would imply that no commodities exported by country i would be imported by country j.
7
  This index is 
included as one of the independent variables in a gravity model along with data on FDI inflows to 
evaluate total bilateral exports between the countries in APEC. 
The Trans Pacific Parnership 
 Due largely to international political economy forces, large scale multilateral global trade 
agreements such Doha have essentially come to a halt, giving rise to a large number of smaller, regional 
trade agreements.  In the Asia-Pacific region, 47 such agreements had been signed into effect as of June 
2012 with others still in negotiations. 
8
 Currently in negotiations is the Trans Pacific Partnership, which 
would consolidate many of the “noodle bowl” trade agreements already in existence and provide an FTA 
that would span across the Pacific Ocean, including countries from East and Southeast Asia, North 
America and Latin America (Petri, et al, 2012).  The four countries that have already signed into the TPP 
are Brunei, Chile, New Zealand and Singapore; the following countries are currently officially involved in 
negotiations to join into the Free Trade Area (FTA) as of August 2013: United States, Australia, Peru, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Mexico, Canada and Japan; additional countries that have expressed interest in 
joining the TPP but have not been officially involved to date with the negotiations are South Korea, 
Taiwan, Philippines, Laos, Columbia, Costa Rica, Indonesia and Thailand.
9
 
 The stated US objectives for joining the TPP include: 1)To develop more advanced, 
comprehensive, 21
st
 century trade rules; 2) Asian FTA’s normally exclude the US, which can have the 
effect of diverting trade and investment; 3) To strengthen linkages with Asia-Pacific in a way that benefits 
US producers; 4)It is beneficial for the US to consolidate its FTA’s as opposed to signing numerous 
individual bilateral agreements.  While these are the stated goals of the US, many observers believe that 
primarily geopolitical concerns are driving the US involvement in the trade negotiations in order to gain 
power in relation to China within the region.  Others maintain that it is China who seeks to maintain its 
own hegemony in East Asia and has signed many RTA’s for such a purpose (Petri, et al, 2012). 
Methodological Overview 
 Historical raw trade data used in this analysis is UN data that has been revised and published by 
the NBER; the time period covered spans from 1962 – 2006, although data is not complete for all 
                                                     
6
 Bowles and MacLean, 1996, pg. 331. 
7
 Otsubo and Umemura (2003) page 130. 
8
 Most of these agreements exist between ASEAN countries and other countries in the region (Petri, et al, 2012, pg. 
5). 
9
 Wikipedia, “Trans Pacific Partnership.” 
5 
 
countries over the entire period.
10
  The export/import commodities have been disaggregated into four digit 
SITC4 code, such that for each country, for each year, each observation shows by commodity code, the 
dollar amount of each exported or imported good and which country exported or imported that good.  
Additional macro data was obtained from Penn World Tables on trade openness, GDP and per capita 
GDP, the percentage of per capita GDP on consumption; data for real effective exchange rates (REER) 
was obtained from Bruegel.
11
   
For the regression model, the bilateral Cij index was computed for all of the APEC 21countries
12
 
plus India, because it is one of the RCEP countries.
13
  These indices were computed with the formula 
described by Otsubo and Umemura:       (∑ |
   
  
 
   
  
| )    using the raw UN-NBER data.  The 
results were pooled into a panel data set, such that there are 420 pairs of countries, each country as the 
exporter to every other country as the importer, over a 45 year span of time
14
.  The macro data from Penn 
World Tables and Bruegel was used to compute additional indices included in the panel set, such as 
relative per capita income, total GDP between each pair of exporter/importer, relative share of per capita 
income spent on consumption (marginal propensity to consume), relative trade openness; relative REER 
was computed from the Bruegel data.  In addition to the Cij index, also computed from the UN-NBER 
data is a modified intra-industry trade index, to be referred to as the parts and components (log P/C) 
index
15
 which can be described by the following equation:            
   
    
⁄
   
    
⁄
 where PCx/MFGx is 
the share of parts and components within the total manufactured export commodities and PCm/MFGm is 
the share of parts and components within the manufactured imported commodities. 
Geo Pair is a dummy variable indicating that both of the countries are part of the same 
geographical region as determined by the UN
16
 and RTA is a dummy variable that both countries are the 
member of NAFTA, ASEAN or negotiating the TPP agreement.  Additional regressions include dummy 
variables for China exporting to and importing from the ASEAN countries, as well as the USA exporting 
to and importing from ASEAN.  The Cij index was computed for all commodities and also for 
manufactured commodities, which are those from sitc4 code 5000 through 8999, while excluding those 
with sitc4 code 6800 through 6899.   The Cij for all commodities and manufactured commodities has been 
adjusted from the scale of 0 to 1 into an infinite log by the following computation:           (
   
     
).  
This transformation is done to remove any bias which can occur from having the range of values within a 
finite set from 0 to 1. 
This study seeks to answer the question: Is the Trans Pacific Partnership a ‘natural’ trade bloc.  
According to Krugman, the answer to this question would be immediately “no,” because the countries 
that are involved in the negotiations are not located on the same continent, or even the same hemisphere, 
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for that matter.  This paper assumes that Krugman is correct that geographical closeness does lead to 
‘natural’ trading partners, but seeks to determine whether a trade agreement between countries that are not 
located in close geographic proximity can still be a ‘natural’ trade bloc.  The model will use the trade 
complementarity index as the dependent variable, which removes the trade bias and distortions that might 
be included in a trade intensity index.
17
  The equation for the gravity model of trade complementarity:  
          (         )     (
           
           
)     (
  
  
)     (
     
     
)     (
     
     
)
                      
 There are two key limitations to this regression model; first, the economic question that this paper 
seeks to answer is one that is intertwined with current political-economic events, but the data used for the 
analysis ends in 2006.  However, we can still explore the trends in trade complementarity over time to 
forecast the success of a free trade agreement.  Additionally, at the time that the US began the 
negotiations to enter the TPP, the data was current:  Brunei Darussalam, Chile, New Zealand and 




Secondly, the explanatory variables are dummy variables with fixed effects over time, which 
generates collinearity in fixed effects GLS regressions, so the Maximum Likelihood method was used as a 
substitute.  The main limitation of this substitution is that the Hausman test between fixed and random 
effects cannot be used, because the test statistics are computed differently.  For this reason, the Sargan test 
of overidentifying restrictions is used as a substitute for evaluating the consistency of the random effects 
regressions.  For the Arellano-Bond time series GMM regressions, an alternate regression method known 
as xtabond2 in the Stata statistical software package is used, because it allows for fixed effects dummy 
variables to be included as instruments.   
 The empirical analysis arranged as follows: the first section examines the nature of regional trade 
agreements by measuring the impact of various macroeconomic variables on bilateral trade 
complementarity and then adding dummy variables representing NAFTA, RCEP and TPP.  The second 
section repeats all of the regressions from the first section, but using the Arellano–Bond time series GMM 
to control for autocorrelation in the panel data.  The third section evaluates the political-economic nature 
of US and China trade relations in Southeast Asia using graphical methods.   
 For all empirical results included in this paper: * = significant at the 90% confidence level; ** = 
significant at the 95% confidence level; *** = significant at the 99% confidence level. 
Empirical Results for RTA Analysis 
 The first set of regressions includes only the control variables: log GDP total is the log of 
GDPi*GDPj; log GDP capita is the log of per capita GDP in the exporting country divided by the per 
capita income of the importer; log Consumption is the log of the relative consumption share of per capita 
income between the exporter and importer; log Openness is the log of the relative level of trade openness 
between the exporter and importer; log REER is the log of the relative real effective exchange rate 
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between the exporter and importer; log P/C is the relative share of parts and components of manufactured 
commmodities between the exporter and importer; GeoPair is a dummy variable that the trading partners 
are in the same geographic region.  As mentioned in the overview, for fixed effects regressions, the results 
are computed using the maximum likelihood method, because of collinearity between the fixed effects in 
the regression and the dummy variables for Geo Pair and RTA.
19
  





 with fixed effects  
 
 
 only Cij: All  Cij: MFG 
log GDP total .17***  .127*** 
 
(.002)  (.002) 
log GDP capita .019***  .08*** 
 
(.003)  (.003) 
log Consumption -.337***  -.277*** 
 
(.022)  (.021) 
log Openness -.215***  -.202*** 
 
(.005)  (.005) 
log REER -.035***  -.024** 
 
(.01)  (.009) 
log P/C .303***  .224*** 
 
(.006)  (.006) 
Geo Pair .204***  .145*** 
 (.014)  (.014) 
# of observations 16130  16130 
Wald Chi^2 17885.4***  12493.6*** 
log likelihood -15420.8  -14901.376 
RE sd(residual) .63***  .61*** 
 (.0035)  (.003) 
 
 As would be expected from a gravity model, table 1 shows the coefficients for total GDP and for 
Geo Pair are both positive and significant, although it is of interest that an increase in relative per capita 
GDP is also positive and significant.  Otsubo and Umemura (2003) discuss that while the gravity model is 
often considered to stand alone from economic theory, it is based upon the maximization of utility subject 
to the budget constraint of national income.
20
  As would be expected, the relative marginal propensity to 
consume is negatively related, since countries which consume more would have a different set of 
preferences than those who consume less, and these preferences are likely reflected by the basket of 
goods which are produced in the given country, and therefore exported.  Likewise, it is logical for the 
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relative trade openness and real effective exchange rates to be negatively related to trade complementarity 
as explained by international trade theory: an increase in the relative exchange rate makes goods more 
expensive to the importer and countries which trade less are less likely to import goods in general.  The 
coefficient for the parts and components index is positive and significant, given that it is a measurement 
of the parts and components exported by one country relative to the parts and components imported by 
the other. 
 
Table 2: GLS 
Random Effects Cij: All 
 
Cij: MFG 

















































R^2 within .5792 
 
.4447 
R^2 between .3886 
 
.3140 
R^2 overall .4638 
 
.3631 
# of observations 16130 
 
16130 
# of groups 420 
 
420 
Obs per group: min 9 
 
9 
Obs per group: max 45 
 
45 
Wald Chi^2 21754.05*** 
 
12709.81*** 
sigma u .481 
 
.454 













The coefficients for the GLS random effects regression are quite similar to those from the 
maximum likelihood fixed effects regression; the signs for all values are the same, although in some cases 
the magnitude is significantly different for some variables.  Because the Hausman test cannot be used to 
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compare the maximum likelihood regression with fixed effects to the GLS random effects regression, we 
must rely on the Sargan – Hansen chi^2 statistic which is significant,  so we reject the null hypothesis that 
the overidentifying restrictions are valid and therefore rely on the results from the fixed effects regression. 
Of interest is that for manufactured commodities, the coefficient is positive, however it is unclear if this is 
due to economic circumstances or because the random effects regression is not i.i.d..   
Regressions including  the Trans-Pacific Partnership  
 The following regressions include a dummy variable for the proposed TPP trade agreement; if 
both countries are among the current negotiating members of the agreement, that pair will take on a value 
of 1 for the entire time series, zero otherwise.  The purpose of this is to determine if the countries 
involved in the agreement  are complementary trade partners, which is important to determine if free trade 
between them will increase or divert trade.   
Table 3: Maximim 
likelihood 
   with fixed effects  
   only Cij: All 
 
Cij: MFG 
























































# of observations 16130 
 
16130 
Wald Chi^2 18708.55*** 
 
15282.11*** 
log likelihood -15227.93 
 
-14151.631 
RE sd(residual) .622*** 
 
.582*** 
 (.085)  (.003) 
 
 Table 3 shows the results from the maximum likelihood fixed effects regression; there is a 
significant positive impact on trade complementarity for the TPP countries, even after controlling for 
geographic proximity, in fact, for manufactured commodities, the coefficient for the TPP dummy variable 
is more than twice as large as the coefficient for the Geo Pair dummy.  All of the other control variables 
10 
 
remain consistent with the previous regression results.  The results for the GLS random effects 
regressions in Table 4 are consistent with the maximimum likelihood estimation, with an overall R^2 
between .4 and .5, although we have to reject the null hypothesis that the results are i.i.d. because of the 
chi^2 value for the Sargan – Hansen overidentification test. 
 
Table 4: GLS 
Random Effects Cij: All 
 
Cij: MFG 
























































R^2 within .5791 
 
.4446 
R^2 between .411 
 
.3896 
R^2 overall .4765 
 
.417 
# of observations 16130 
 
16130 
# of groups 420 
 
420 
Obs per group: min 9 
 
9 
Obs per group: max 45 
 
45 
Wald Chi^2 21786.59*** 
 
12807.9*** 
sigma u .472 
 
.423 











Regressions comparing TPP with NAFTA and RCEP 
Table 5: Maximim 
likelihood 
   with fixed effects  
   
11 
 
only Cij: All 
 
Cij: MFG 






































































# of observations 16130 
 
16130 
Wald Chi^2 19054.04*** 
 
15528.34*** 
log likelihood -15148.343 
 
-14088.659 
RE sd(residual) .619*** 
 
.58*** 
 (.003)  (.003) 
 
 As can be seen in Table 5, when all commodities are taken into account, all three of the RTA 
dummy variables have positive and significant coefficients, although the magnitude for the RCEP dummy 
is smaller than the other two.  One point of interest is the difference in magnitude of the coefficient for 
NAFTA between manufactured and all commodities, which can possibly be attributed to the large amount 
of trade of agricultural goods and mineral fuel and oil amongst the NAFTA countries.
22
 Since most of the 
countries in the East and Southeast Asian regions do not specialize in the export of raw materials, there is 
little difference between the all commodity and manufactured commodity classification.  These countries 
often focus on labor – intensive industries to produce goods intended to be consumed by higher income 
nations in North America and Europe.  Much of the rapid growth in exports within this region can be 
attributed to inward foreign direct investment and intra industry trade between Asia and the West.
23
   
For both commodity classifications, the TPP dummy has a larger coefficient than the dummy for 
Geo Pair and is twice as large for manufactured commodities compared to all commodities.  The 
Heckscher-Ohlin trade model suggests that countries with an abundance of a particular resource should 




 Chow (2012), page 229. 
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specialize in the production of goods that are intensive in that resource.  Previous empirical studies have 
shown that while there is limited support for this theory amongst developed countries, it can be applied 
quite well to trade relations between developed and developing countries. 
24
 Therefore, a trade agreement 
between countries in different geographic regions such as the TPP can represent a more ‘natural’ 
partnership than intra-regional trade if it allows countries to better specialize in those areas which they 
have a comparative advantage. 
Time Series Regressions 
 In order to control for autocorrelation in the regression model, the next results are computed using 
an Arellano-Bond GMM regression, which uses lagged values of the dependent variable, and in some 
cases, lagged values of independent variables as instruments.  An excellent description of the 
mathematical foundation of the AR-Bond regression is described by Roodman (2009) as well as how to 
compute the regression using the statistical software package, Stata.  The results are computed using a 
two-step, system GMM estimator which can be more efficient in computing standard errors than a one-
step estimator, and allows for the inclusion of dummy variables which would otherwise be dropped for 
collinearity. In the following regression, there are no lagged values of the independent variables, but 
autocorrelation is controlled for by including the lagged dependent variable.  The equation for the model: 
                    (         )     (
           
           
)     (
  
  
)     (
     
     
)     (
     
     
)  
                     
The dummy variables for Geo Pair and RTA are treated in the regression as instrumental variables, all 
others are treated as predetermined.  The reasoning behind including the RTA dummy variables as strictly 
exogenous is because there is no time-series element to the inclusion of the dummy, such that a bilateral 
trade pair receives a value of 1 for the entire time period of evaluation. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Table 6: Arellano-










Cijt-2    .142*** 
   (.0006) 




























log REER -.013*** 
 
-.008*** 
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# of observations 15850 
 
15550 
# of instruments 4236 
 
4190 


















 Table 6 shows the results for the AR-Bond regression: For the manufactured commodities 
regression, when only the first lagged period was included, the AR(2) statistic had a p-value of .014, 
which means that autocorrelation was still present in the model, requiring that the second lagged period 
be added, which was not necessary for the all commodity model.  Once again, we can see a substantial 
increase in trade complementarity for the TPP coefficient for manufactured goods, which further 
underscores the application of the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model between developing and developed 
countries, both of which are present within the list of TPP countries. 
 NAFTA, RCEP and TPP 
Table 7: Arellano-










Cijt-2   .142*** 
   (.0005) 



































log P/C .026*** 
 
.008*** 
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# of observations 15850 
 
15550 
# of instruments 4237 
 
4192 









Hansen overid.  418.93 
 
418.06 




 Once again, Table 7 shows the second period lagged dependent variable was included for 
manufactured commodities because of a significant AR(2) stat when only the first lagged period was 
included in the model.  Immediately noticeable, the coefficients for both NAFTA and RCEP are not 
significant for manufactured commodities at all when autocorrelation is controlled for, and the coefficient 
for NAFTA is actually negative, which is likely attributable to the fact that most of the trade between the 
NAFTA nations is in oil and agricultural goods.  Of the three, TPP is positive and significant, both for all 
commodities and when only manufactured goods are considered, although the coefficient for 
manufactured goods is only significant at the 95% confidence level.  It would certainly seem from these 
results that the Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement does certainly represent an inter-regional ‘natural’ 
trade bloc and would also provide empirical support for the Heckscher – Ohlin model as applied to trade 
between developed and developing countries.   
Graphical Analysis of Historical US and China Trade with ASEAN 
 As described in the literature review of this paper, there are critics of the TPP who assert that the 
US involvement in the pact are more politically driven than for economic reasons; these concerns arise 
due to political tensions between the US and China in the Asia – Pacific region
26
.  Others have asserted 
that it is actually China who has pursued trade agreements with countries in Southeast Asia for the 
purpose of increasing its political influence in the region; in 2005, China enacted a free trade agreement 
with the ASEAN-10 and has subsequently pursued trade agreements with the other members of the 
RCEP.  In order to further understand the trade relationships of the US and China in Southeast Asia, this 
paper draws a comparison between the ASEAN countries and each country, although only Brunei, 
Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are either members of the TPP or negotiating to become members. 
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 Petri, Plummer and Zhai (2012), pp. 10-11. 
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   Graph 1 below charts the Cij index for all observations in which the exporting country is the 
USA and the importing country is one of the seven ASEAN
27
 countries that have been used in this 
analysis.  The average Cij index for all commodities for all countries is .2463 and the standard deviation 
is .145, so any observation over .391 is one standard deviation higher than the average and a value over 
.536 is two standard deviations above the mean.  All of the ASEAN importers have a complementarity 
index with the US which reaches the two standard deviation threshold at some point past the year 2000, 
which would suggest that at the 95% confidence level, the US can be considered a complentary exporter 
to the region.  Of these ASEAN countries, only Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam are either current 




Graph 2 also charts the bilateral trade complementarity index for observations with the USA as 
the exporting country and the seven included ASEAN countries, but for manufactured commodities only.  
For these commodities, the overall mean Cij is .302 with a standard deviation of .151, so values over .453 
represent observations that are more than one standard deviation from the mean and .604 is the threshold 
for two standard deviations.  One difference which immediately presents itself to the viewer of these two 
graphs is that the overall trend for all commodities is generally upward, while for manufactured 
commodities the trend is relatively flat.  Thailand, Korea and Singapore all break the two standard 
deviation threshold in the time period past 2000, while Malaysia had broken that threshold during the 
1970’s, but declined thereafter, while remaining solidly above a 50% complementarity value. 
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Graph 2  
Graph 3 represents the time series bilateral trade complementarity between China and the 
ASEAN countries for all commodities.  While the general trend post-1990 is in the upward direction, at 
no point in the graph does the Cij index exceed the two standard deviation mark of .536 for any of the 
ASEAN countries, although most of the countries do break the one standard deviation mark of .3913 after 
2000, with the exception of Vietnam.  One point of interest is that for most of the time series, the trend is 
relatively flat overall 
 


























Graph 4 displays the same bilateral trade complementarity index between China and the ASEAN 
countries, but for manufactured commodities.  While the trend in the years leading up to 1990 is 
downward and for all countries below the overall mean of .302 there is a steady and consistent rise from 
1990 onward, although for most of the countries, the one standard deviation mark is barely breached, 
although the upward trend in trade complementarity in recent years does provide some economic support 
for China’s pursuits of free trade in Southeast Asia. 
 
Graph 4 
Graph 5 evaluates trade complementarity between the ASEAN countries as the exporter and the 
USA as the importing country.  Most of the ASEAN countries had complementarity indices below the 
mean of .2463 prior to 1970, with a steady and consistent upward trend through the 1990’s, which held 
flat thereafter into the 2000’s.  The overall high points in the graph are not as high as the values seen 
earlier for exports from the USA to Southeast Asia.  One plausible explanation for the general trends in 
the graph is that the members of the ASEAN RTA are considered to be developing countries; the initial 
regression results show that an increase in total GDP between the countries increases trade 

















Graph 6 evaluates the same trade complementarity for ASEAN exports to US imports for 
manufactured goods only.   Again, there is a general positive trend for the Cij index, in this case, 
beginning in the mid 1980’s and increasing through the 2000’s, although none break the two standard 
deviation threshold from the mean Cij of .302 for manufactured commodities and only Korea and 
Thailand ever exceed a 50% complementarity value.   
This brings up a very important issue for US trade policy: many labor unions and assorted anti-
globalization activists often oppose trade agreements because they believe it reduces manufacturing 
employment in the US.  When one compares the manufactured goods trade complementarity when the US 
is exporting to ASEAN with the complementarity for ASEAN exports to the US, the index is significantly 
higher for US exports to ASEAN than for US imports from ASEAN.   For the TPP specifically, Malaysia, 
Singapore and Vietnam never even exceed the threshold of one standard deviation above the mean for 
their exports to the US.  What this implies is that if the US were to enter into the TPP, policy makers 
should expect that manufactured exports to Asia-Pacific would increase far more than imports, and there 

















  Graphs 7 and 8 chart the export complementarity from the ASEAN countries to China, the first 
for all commodities, and the second for manufactured commodities.  Prior to the mid 1980’s, most of the 
ASEAN countries have below a 10% trade complementarity to China, although beginning in 1990, there 
is a sharp upward trend, with Korea peaking just over .6 and both Singapore and Malaysia exceeding 
.536, which is two standard deviations above the mean of .2463.  These results do provide some empirical 




























China began its policy of trade liberalization in 1978 although they approached this with great 
caution and imposed a system of high tariffs in the early 1980’s
28
, the effects of which can be clearly seen 
by the steep decline in complementarity for both graphs from about 1983 through 1985.  By the end of the 
decade, China had adopted a dual-tiered trade system in which certain provinces in the coastal areas were 
permitted greater freedom to engage in trade, which can be seen in the increases in trade complementarity 
by 1990, at which point, the trend remains positive through the 2000’s, although for Vietnam it never 
even exceeds the mean for either all commodities or manufactured commodities. 
 Graph 9 charts the trade complementarity between the US and China, which has been a source of 
debate between policy makers of both countries as well as amongst policy makers domestically.  Once 
again, one can observe the total decline for imported goods by China following the policy initiative of 
raising prohibitive tariffs and other non-tariff barriers for import.  For exports from China to the US, the 
trend has been steadily positive after 1990 through the 2000’s, reaching the two standard deviation 
threshold for both all commodities and manufactured commodities.   However, for US exports to China 
for both all commodities and manufactured commodities, the trend is positive up to 2000 and then 
declines from 2000 to 2006 from .6 to .55 for manufactured commodities and from about .575 to about 
.55 for all commodities.  These are still high complementarity index values, although it would be 
necessary to look at more recent data to determine how these trends continue.   
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Summary and Conclusions 
 The future of the Trans-Pacific Partnership is yet to be determined, as it meets the usual political-
economic headwinds of any trade agreement, such as domestic opposition from labor groups and other 
protectionists as well as determining the exact ‘nuts and bolts’ of the agreement in the international 
negotiation process.  However, this research should clearly have demonstrated the following: 1) Inter-
regional trade agreements can represent a ‘natural’ trade partnership in accordance with the application of 
Hecksher-Ohlin trade model towards bilateral trade between developing and developed  countries; this 
trade partnership can even be a more ‘natural’ trade partnership than intra-regional trade as long as 
transportation costs are not prohibitive and information can flow freely across geographic areas with the 
internet. 2)The Trans-Pacific Partnership does specifically represent a ‘natural’ trade bloc in the general 
sense as just described as evaluated by several econometric techniques, and for manufactured goods is 
actually a more ‘natural’ trade agreement than NAFTA or the RCEP. 3)The USA’s pursuits of free trade 
in the Asia-Pacific region do have a legitimate economic benefit for the US, and would likely benefit, not 
detract from the US manufacturing industry.  Given the political tensions between China and the US, it 
would likely benefit the US tremendously to pursue alternative trade relations in the Asia-Pacific region, 
as would be accomplished by joining the TPP.  4) While China may be establishing its influence over 
Southeast Asia with its military and through other political processes, and regression analysis does not 
support its pursuit of trade agreement for purely economic reasons, the trends in recent years do show that 
its trade complementarity in the region has been increasing steadily, so it cannot be concluded that it has 
no economic rationale for signing regional trade agreements. 
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Appendix 
1. Countries Used in Analysis 
 Total List of Countries  
Australia  Canada  Chile  China  Hong Kong  India  Indonesia  Japan  Korea  Malaysia  Mexico  New 
Zealand  Papua New Guinea  Peru  Philippines  Russian Federation  Singapore  Taiwan  Thailand  USA  
Vietnam 
List of Countries by Regional Trade Agreements 
23 
 
TPP: Australia  Chile  Canada  Japan  Malaysia  Mexico  New Zealand  Peru  Singapore  USA  Vietnam
29
 
NAFTA: USA  Mexico  Canada 
RCEP: China  Japan  Korea  India  Australia  New Zealand  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand Vietnam 
ASEAN: Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam  Korea 
List of Countries by Geographic Region
30
 
Central America: Mexico 
South America: Chile  Peru 
North America: USA  Canada 
East Asia: China  Taiwan  Hong Kong  Japan  Korea 
Southern Asia: India 
Southeast Asia:  Indonesia  Malaysia  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Vietnam 
Eastern Europe:  Russian Federation 
Australia and New Zealand: Australia  New Zealand 
Melanesia: Papua New Guinea  
2. Missing Data 
Missing Trade Data 
Russian Fed: Import data from 1962-1996;  Export Data from 1962 – 1988 
India: Import data 2000 
Papua New Guinea: Export data 2005, 2006 
Missing Macro Data 
Papua New Guinea: REER data from 1962 – 1970 
China: REER data from 1962 – 1968 
HK: REER data from 1962 – 1968 
Russian Federation: GDP Total, GDP per capita, Consumption, Openness, REER: 1962 – 1989 
Vietnam: GDP Total, GDP per capita, Consumption, Openness: 1962-1969; REER: 1962-1979 
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 Brunei Darussalam is a signed member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, but was excluded from the analysis due 
to a lack of trade and other data. 
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3. Descriptive Statistics 
Cij: All Commodities Observations Mean SD Min Max 
All Countries 16130 0.2569 0.1446 0.00141 0.72327 
TPP 4590 0.28595 0.1587 0.0159 0.72727 
NAFTA 270 0.4904 0.14014 0.1875 0.7113 
ASEAN 1170 0.2434 0.1395 0.011 0.72327 
RCEP 4454 0.26347 0.1318 0.0014 0.72327 
      Cij: MFG 
Commodities Observations Mean SD Min Max 
All Countries 16130 0.313 0.1497 0.0011 0.77237 
TPP 4590 0.37 0.1536 0.038 0.7724 
NAFTA 270 0.533 0.1415 0.1498 0.7331 
ASEAN 1170 0.2765 0.145 0.0264 0.77237 




4. Non-Parametric Tests 
Correlation Table with 
P-values 













log IIT log 
GDP 
total 
Cij: All 1        
         
Cij: MFG 0.8834 1       
p-value 0        
log y 0.1418 0.249 1      
p-value 0 0       
log Consumption -
0.0379 
-0.0132 0.0177 1     
25 
 
p-value 0 0.0925 0.025      
log Openness -
0.1589 
-0.1886 0.0057 -0.4248 1    
p-value 0 0 0.4722 0     
log REER -
0.0175 
-0.0675 -0.329 -0.2344 0.0914 1   
p-value 0.0265 0 0 0 0    
log IIT 0.3904 0.3709 0.3246 -0.1832 0.2165 0 1  
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0.9964   
log GDP Total 0.6239 0.5391 -0.0019 -0.0054 -0.0035 -0.0091 0.1785 1 
p-value 0 0 0.8097 0.491 0.6561 0.2466 0  
 
